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Abstract
We reformulate neoclassical consumer choice by focusing on λ, the marginal utility
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1 Introduction
When faced with the simple task of deciding how much to buy of a particular good at a
given price, Homo Economicus solves a horrendously complex problem. She maximizes her
utility by choosing a lifetime consumption plan that takes into consideration all the contin-
gencies she might face in the immediate and distant future (as well as frictions, asymmetric
information, and other complications), and then executes the first component of this plan
by purchasing the optimal amount of the good in question.
Not surprisingly, economists have found ways to make consumer choice theory more
tractable. The textbook approach assumes, explicitly or implicitly, that the good in question
has at most a few substitutes and complements, and chops off this small portion of the
lifetime problem. To this portion it applies a budget constraint, and analyzes the budget-
constrained consumer’s reaction to surprises in prices and availability of the target good and
related goods, as well as to unplanned changes in the budget itself (e.g., Hal Varian, 1992,
Ch. 7-8).
Unfortunately the textbook analysis has serious shortcomings. By fully separating the
subproblem from the larger problem, the budget constraint rules out substitution of pur-
chasing power across the boundary, irrespective of the realization of prices, etc. As we will
see, a fixed budget constraint distorts the solution because the size of the optimal budget
is highly sensitive to variations in the subproblem. One could mitigate the distortion by
broadening the subproblem – perhaps to a set where a bona fide liquidity constraint binds –
but that would forfeit the simplicity of partial equilibrium and would tie together decisions
over goods whose consumption utilities are independent of each other. Thus standard partial
equilibrium analysis does violence to the underlying general equilibrium problem, but it is
widely accepted that this is the price that must be paid for tractability.
This essay will challenge that view. We argue for a robust, flexible and natural approach
to disaggregation, simpler than the textbook approach but no less rigorous. The basic
idea is to use the marginal utility of money, rather than the budget constraint, to link the
subproblem to the rest-of-life problem. Using a cardinal utility function, the consumer can
react to changes in the environment by substituting optimally within the subproblem and
also by optimally shifting purchasing power across the subproblem boundary. The marginal
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utility of money provides a robust criterion for the trade-off between subproblem and rest-
of-life, and it resonates with the findings of consumer research.
Section 2 presents a standard general equilibrium formulation of the consumer’s life-
time problem, and offers a simple definition of separable subproblems. After reviewing the
textbook approach to the subproblem, it shows how our new Marshallian approach offers
a somewhat different solution. The next section compares textbook comparative statics to
those of the new Marshallian approach: the substitution effect is the same, but income effects
and overall effects differ.
Section 4 then extends the new Marshallian approach to indivisible goods, and to larger
subproblems. It shows how the consumer can use personal experience to update the marginal
utility of money without trying to resolve the entire lifetime problem. The section also
shows how to model liquidity-constrained consumers, including those who live paycheck to
paycheck.
Section 5 discusses further applications of the new Marshallian approach. The marginal
utility of money provides a simple heuristic that seems consistent with descriptions of con-
sumer behavior in the marketing literature, and is a useful counterpoint to the behavioral
economics notion of mental accounting. Somewhat more speculatively, the section proposes
connections to the management of multidivisional firms and to money illusion.
A concluding discussion reiterates that, compared to the textbook approach, the new
Marshallian approach offers (a) more robust prescriptions for how consumers should react
to surprises, (b) a better way to connect partial equilibrium to general equilibrium analysis,
and also (c) more plausible descriptions of actual human behavior.
An historical perspective may be helpful before we begin. The idea of a cardinal utility
function defined over purchasing power goes back at least to Jeremy Bentham (1802), as does
the argument that marginal utility diminishes. Alfred Marshall (1890, 1920), synthesizing
the work of earlier Marginalists, obtained the crucial first order condition (that marginal
utility for each good equals its price times the marginal utility of money) in the special case
that total utility is additively separable in each good. “Edgeworth destroyed this pleasant
simplicity and specificity when he wrote the total utility function as f(x1, x2, x3, ...),” says
George Stigler (1950, p. 322). It fell to John Hicks and Roy Allen (1934) to show how to
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impose a budget set to derive demand functions and cross-price elasticities when goods might
have complements and substitutes. Their analysis, developed further by Paul Samuelson and
a host of other economists, eventually became textbook orthodoxy.
We present a model in the spirit of Marshall that can deal with Edgeworth’s complica-
tions. The model uses cardinal utility to obtain price elasticities that closely approximate
the general equilibrium elasticities.
2 The consumer choice problem
We begin by showing how to separate a tractable subproblem from the horrendously complex
lifetime choice problem, and then distinguish our new Marshallian solution of the subproblem
from the textbook solution.
2.1 A subproblem of the lifetime problem
Let X ∈ <N represent an agent’s lifetime plan of work and consumption. Using the notation
x−i = min{0, xi} ≤ 0 and x+i = xi − x−i = max{0, xi} ≥ 0, work is represented by the
negative components X− = (x−1 , ..., x
−
N) – analogous to inputs of a production function –
and consumption by the positive components X+ = (x+1 , ..., x
+
N) – analogous to outputs, with
investment in human capital included. Of course, the number N of goods is astronomically
large, especially if we follow Arrow and Debreu in indexing goods separately by location,
date and (for unresolved contingencies) the realized state of Nature.
The agent takes as given a price vector P ∈ <N+ , and has preferences represented by
a utility function U defined over a set that contains all feasible plans. “Feasible” means
that X satisfies any relevant technological constraints (e.g., that a day’s activities can be
done in 24 hours) and also that it satisfies PX =
∑N
i=1 PiXi = 0. That is (after including
special sorts of work such as selling endowed assets and special sorts of consumption such as
taxes and gifts), lifetime income −PX− > 0 equals lifetime expenditure PX+. Sometimes
it will be convenient also to refer to exogenous transfers of purchasing power by changing
the endowment of good i = 0, whose price P0 is normalized to 1.
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Assume for now (later we will relax this) that all purchasing power is liquid: L = x0 −
PX− > 0 is available without further constraint. Letting ξ(L, P ) denote the set of feasible
plans, the indirect lifetime utility function is
Vo(L, P ) = maxU(X) s.t. X ∈ ξ(L, P ). (1)
A consumer subproblem is to choose an n-subvector of the consumption vector X+ of a
lifetime plan X. By rearranging the indexing, we can write the subvector as x ∈ ξ[n](L, P ) ⊂
<n+ and the rest of the life plan as X⊥ = (x0, 0, ..., 0, xn+1, xn+2, ..., xN) ∈ ξ⊥(L, P ), where
ξ[n](L, P ) denotes the n-subvectors of ξ, and ξ⊥(L, P ) denotes the complementary subvectors.
The corresponding price subvector of P is denoted p ∈ <n+. Typically n is small, perhaps
just 1 or 2.
The subproblem is separable if, for some utility function u defined on Rn+ we can, with
negligible error, write
U(X) = u(x) + U(X⊥) (2)
for any feasible plan X. A sufficient condition for separability is that the cross second partial
derivative Uij = 0 everywhere for all i = 1, ..., n and j = n+ 1, ..., N .
Substituting equation (2) into (1), we have the following recursion:
Vo(L) = max
x∈ξ[n]
{u(x) + V (L− px)} , (3)
where V (L) denotes the rest-of-life indirect utility function, defined as in (1) but with X
restricted to ξ⊥(L, P ). The dependence on the rest-of-life prices P⊥ is suppressed in order
to emphasize the impact of the subproblem price vector p. The equation says that if today’s
subproblem is separable, then the only effect today’s consumption has on subsequent utility is
via today’s expenditure px =
∑n
i=1 pixi, which reduces the consumer’s subsequent purchasing
power. Of course, the subproblem need not be separated chronologically, but if it is then (3)
can be regarded as a Bellman equation with discounting built into P⊥.
Thus the consumer’s subproblem is to choose her optimal basket of n goods that have
possibly interdependent consumption values, but that are separable from the consumption
values of all other goods.
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2.2 Solving the subproblem
The textbook solution method is to impose a budget B > 0 on the subproblem.1 Assuming
that there are no other constraints, the subproblem becomes
max
x≥0
u(x) s.t. px ≤ B. (4)
To focus on relevant issues, we assume henceforth that u is twice continuously differen-
tiable and strictly monotone increasing, and that (4) has a regular interior solution. The
Lagrangian is
max
(x,µ)≥0
[u(x) + µ(B − px)] , (5)
with first-order conditions
ui(x
∗) = µpi, i = 1, ..., n
B = px∗. (6)
By regularity, the strict second order condition also holds: the Hessian matrix D2u(x∗) =
(ui,j(x
∗))i,j=1,...,n is negative definite on the tangent space normal to p. For n = 2 that
condition implies that the determinant u11u22−u12u21 > 0. The unique solution to (5) is the
textbook demand function, denoted x∗(p,B).
We recommend a different way to solve the subproblem. The idea is to endogenize expen-
diture and, instead of an arbitrary budget B, to focus on the opportunity cost of expenditure
in the lifetime problem. That opportunity cost, which we refer to as the marginal utility
of money, is obtained by linearizing the indirect utility function V around L. Linearization
is reasonable because the range of sensible subproblem expenditures typically is dwarfed by
life-time expenditure. (Section 4.2 below will discuss large subproblems for which a linear
approximation is inadequate.)
For the approach to make sense, V must be cardinal. That is, it must be defined up to an
increasing linear transformation, as in von Neumann and Morgenstern. By construction, V
is increasing in L and we shall further assume that it is smooth and concave, i.e., V ′(L) > 0
1One seldom asks where B comes from. To find the optimal B, one has to solve the lifetime problem (3),
which means that we have no simplification at all. In practice, B is apparently chosen via some unspecified
rule of thumb.
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and V ′′(L) ≤ 0 for L in the relevant range. A sufficient condition is that, analogous to
production functions, U is smooth, monotone, and exhibits decreasing returns to scale in
relevant regions.
Thus a preliminary step is to take the first-order Taylor approximation of the indirect
utility function for the lifetime problem. Defining λ = V ′(L) as the marginal utility of money,
we have
V (L− px) ≈ V (L)− λpx for px << L. (7)
Substituting the linearization (7) into the lifetime optimization problem (3) and dropping
the constant term V (L), we obtain the subproblem objective function, which is subject to
no further constraint
max
x≥0
[u(x)− λxp] . (8)
In the subproblem (8), the parameter λ is exogenous, and the equation invites alternative
characterizations of its role. Thus the marginal utility of money may also be thought of as
the opportunity cost of today’s expenditure, or the “shadow utility” of purchasing power,
or the “conversion rate” between utility and money. Note that λ depends only on V and
L, and is independent of u and p in any small subproblem. Indeed, the same value of λ
applies to any subproblem, as long as the linear approximation (7) is valid. By contrast, the
optimal choice of the exogenous parameter B in the standard approach is intimately tied to
the characteristics of the subproblem and hence is much less robust. We will elaborate this
point in Section 3.2 below.
Again assuming a regular interior solution, the first-order conditions for (8) are
ui(x
∗) = λpi, i = 1, ..., n. (9)
We denote the “Marshall-Edgeworth” demand function resulting from the solution of (9) by
M(p, λ). Of course, from (9) one can still recover the usual textbook tangency condition that
for any pair of the n goods in the optimal bundle, the marginal rate of substitution is equal
to the price ratio. Here it is the constant marginal utility of money that gives us that result,
rather than a fixed budget.
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3 Comparing solutions
Observe that (9) is the same as (6) except that λ replaces µ and the budget constraint is
dropped. Dropping one equation makes sense because λ is exogenous in subproblem (8).
But what is the relation between the marginal utility of money, λ, and the shadow price of
the budget constraint, µ? Recall that µ is the marginal consumption utility of a dollar spent
over the budget. If B is not chosen optimally for the lifetime problem (3), then µ differs
from the true marginal cost of overspending, V ′(L− B) ≈ V ′(L) = λ. Thus one can regard
µ as an estimate of λ, where the quality of the estimate depends on the quality of the choice
of the budget.
x2 
x1 x1* 
x2* 
B 
IEP 
expenditure 
Figure 1: Optimal consumption with fixed budget B. The curve in the lower quadrant shows
expenditure e(x) along the IEP as a function of consumption x1 of the first good. Given B > 0 on
the (downward pointing) vertical axis, one finds the corresponding point on the expenditure curve
to locate optimal consumption x∗1 of good 1 on the horizontal axis, and then uses the IEP in the
upper quadrant to locate x∗2 on the (upward pointing) vertical axis.
The two approaches are connected via the Income Expansion Path (IEP), the locus of
points that satisfy the tangency conditions (6) for a given price vector as B varies from zero
to infinity. Since the tangency conditions are the same in (9), viz., that the price ratio equals
the marginal rate of substitution, exactly the same locus of utility maximizing bundles is
traced out by (9) as λ varies from infinity to zero.
Consequently, for any price vector p, the textbook demand function x∗(p,B) and the
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Marshall-Edgeworth demand function M(p, λ) both pick out points on the same IEP. The
earlier discussion shows that the two different decision rules will typically select different
points on this IEP. Figure 1 illustrates the choice of x∗(p,B), and Figure 2 also illustrates
the choice of M(p, λ). The intuition for M(p, λ) is that the consumer moves up the IEP as
long as the utility gain exceeds the opportunity cost of the expenditure, and stops when the
gain diminishes to the point that it is equal to the opportunity cost.
x2* 
x2 
x1 
M2 
x1* 
e(x) 
B 
λp2 
IEP 
u2(x*) M1 
expenditure 
Figure 2: Optimal consumption with given λ. The curve above the leftward pointing horizontal axis
shows the marginal utility for good 2 as a function of its consumption along the IEP (see Appendix
A for its derivation). Given λ > 0 and price p2, one locates their product on that horizontal axis,
finds the corresponding point on the marginal utility curve, and reads off the vertical axis the
optimal consumption M2 of good 2. Using the IEP in the first quadrant, one then locates M1 on
the rightward pointing horizontal axis. In this example, the budget B encourages the consumer to
overspend relative to the lifetime optimal plan.
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3.1 Comparative statics
Let us see how consumers using the λ rule react to small changes in the subproblem, and how
those reactions compare to those of consumers using the budget rule. During this exercise
we hold λ constant, so the elasticities should be regarded as short run.
Income elasticity under the λ rule is trivially zero as long as the consumer is not liquidity
constrained. Since she can freely shift purchasing power across the boundary of the sub-
problem, a marginal shift in income tentatively allocated to the subproblem has no effect on
λ and thus no effect on choice. To call out this simple but important observation, we write
Proposition 1. The (short term) income elasticity of Marshall-Edgeworth demand M(p, λ)
is zero when the consumer faces no liquidity constraints.
Now consider price effects. In the case n = 1, we have (in current notation) M(p1, λ) =
(u1)
−1(λp1), or using Marshall’s enduring convention of putting price on the vertical axis
and quantity on the horizontal axis, the demand curve is simply p1 =
u1(x1)
λ
. As Marshall
explained long ago, one increases consumption of the good until the marginal utility falls to
the price scaled by the marginal utility of money.
The same intuition applies to the general case, except that one increases consumption
of baskets along the IEP. The impact of a change in a single price is complicated by the
implied move to a different IEP. The general case n > 1 is a bit awkward to state, but is
nicely illustrated in the following result for n = 2.
Proposition 2. Let n = 2. Then the sensitivity of the demand function M(p, λ) to the price
of good 1 is given by
dM1(p, λ)
dp1
=
λu22
u11u22 − u12u21 , (10)
dM2(p, λ)
dp1
=
−λu21
u11u22 − u12u21 , (11)
where all the second partials of u are evaluated at the vector x = M(p, λ).
Proof. Recall from (9) that
u1 (M(p, λ)) = λp1
u2 (M(p, λ)) = λp2.
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Differentiating both sides of both equations with respect to p1 and solving the resulting
system of linear equations we obtain the result. Q.E.D.
Note that the denominator in (10) and (11) is the Hessian determinant, which is positive
by the second-order condition for optimality. Of course, the first numerator is negative since
u22 < 0 by concavity, and thus the own price effect is always negative (ruling out Giffen
goods). The sign of the cross price effect is the sign of the numerator in (11), determined by
the cross partial derivative of u at the optimal consumption. If the goods are substitutes,
then u21 < 0 and a rise in the other good’s price will increase the demand of this good,
but if they are complements then u21 > 0 and the same rise will decrease demand. Thus,
price effects in M(p, λ) arise naturally from the curvature of u, and are easy to interpret and
explain.
The case u21 = 0 of separable goods illustrates the contrast with the budget rule. Begin
at an interior point selected by both rules, so p2u1(x1) = p1u2
(
B−x1p1
p2
)
from (6), and
u1(x1)
p1
= u2(x2)
p2
= λ from (9). Now consider a change in the price of good 1. Inspection of
the first expression shows that the budget constrained consumer would have to adjust the
consumption of both goods, while the second expression shows that a consumer using the λ
rule would only adjust x1.
Appendix B details how the impact of a price change can be decomposed into a sub-
stitution and an expenditure effect, and how these relate to the standard Hicks-Slutsky
decomposition.
3.2 A parametric example
A simple constant elasticity of substitution example illustrates the new Marshallian ap-
proach, and suggests why it is far more robust to price surprises than the textbook approach.
Suppose that lifetime preferences are given by U(x1, x2) =
√
x1 + γ
√
x2 with γ >> 1.
The subproblem is to choose x1. This is clearly separable, and the factor γ ensures that it is
indeed “small” relative to the (very simplified) rest-of-life problem of choosing x2. Suppose
that anticipated prices are p1 and p2 >> p1, but p2 ≤ γp1 again consistent with keeping the
subproblem small.
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Letting A = p2
γp1
≤ 1, routine calculations yield the following formulas for the lifetime
optimum:
x∗1 =
L
p1 + p2A−2
, x∗2 =
L
p1A2 + p2
,
Vo(L, P ) =
√
L
p1 + p2A−2
+ γ
√
L.
p1A2 + p2
,
e = B = p1x
∗
1 =
Lp1
p1 + p2A−2
.
Let us derive the marginal utility of money at the optimal expenditure, µ, and our
approximation of it, λ: V (L) = γ
√
L
p2
, and hence
µ = V ′(L− e) = 1
2p1
√
p1 + p2A−2
L
,
while λ = V ′(L) =
γ
2
√
Lp2
.
We shall confirm that the approximation error resulting from evaluating the derivative
of the (indirect) utility function V at the original lifetime liquidity is indeed small. Taking
the ratio of µ and λ, we have
µ
λ
=
√
1 +
p1A2
p2
∈
(
1, 1 +
p1
2p2
)
, (12)
where we have used A ≤ 1 and the fact that √1 + x ≤ 1+ x
2
, showing that the approximation
is close indeed. For example, when p2 = 100p1,
µ
λ
< 1.005.
Next we calculate the elasticities of the optimal expenditure e and the corresponding
marginal utility of money µ relative to the price of today’s good p1. Straightforward differ-
entiation and some manipulation yields that
de
dp1
· p1
e
= − p2
p1A2 + p2
< − p2
p1 + p2
≈ −1. (13)
That is, the optimal expenditure is unit elastic, making it rather sensitive to price changes.
A 50% increase in today’s price will reduce the optimal expenditure for today by roughly
33%, making the budget a poor estimate. On the other hand,
dµ
dp1
· p1
µ
= − p1
p1 + p2A−2
> − p1
p1 + p2
>> −1. (14)
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Returning to the example p2 = 100p1, the elasticity is less than 0.01 (in absolute terms). We
can see that the shadow utility of money is highly inelastic, so as a result of a price surprise µ
hardly changes and thus it is still well approximated by λ – which of course remains constant
as it is determined exclusively by the rest-of-life problem.
Finally it may be worth pointing out that as λ is an underestimate of µ – because V is
concave and we use the Taylor approximation below L – it is a marginally better estimate for
price increases, that yield a decrease in the marginal utility of money, than price decreases.
4 Using λ
Several practical complications arise when choosing consumption via the marginal utility
of money. We will now deal with what we see as the most important complications —
indivisible goods, where a marginal analysis does not directly apply; significant shocks to
lifetime income, including the purchase of big ticket items; using price observations to adapt
λ; and liquidity constraints.
4.1 Indivisibles
How does the λ rule work when goods are indivisible? Consider first the simplest case: the
consumer faces the separable subproblem of whether or not to buy a single indivisible good
(or basket of goods) at price p. Indivisibility is captured in the constraint x ∈ {1, 0}, and
we normalize u(0) = 0. Thus the objective function (8) becomes
max
x∈{1,0}
[u(x)− λxp] = max {0, u(1)− λp} , (15)
since u(x) − λxp = 0 − λ0 = 0 for x = 0. Using the last expression, one can say that the
consumer calculates the ratio u(1)
p
of perceived quality to price and compares it to λ. If the
quality-price ratio, interpreted as value for money, exceeds the marginal utility of money,
then she will buy, and otherwise not buy.2
2John Hauser and Glen Urban (1986) pose as alternative hypotheses that consumers use value for money,
u
p , or “net value,” u − µp, to prioritize purchases of indivisibles. Our analysis shows that the two rankings
are equivalent for separable items, but we now argue that “net value” is the appropriate ranking expression,
as long as µ = λ is properly calibrated.
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When the consumer has to choose one out of several mutually exclusive varieties or
baskets, the quality-price ratio is no longer sufficient to rank them. A very small basket
may offer a high value for money, but still provide only a small utility gain. Instead, the
consumer ranks baskets bk = (xk1, ..., x
k
n) of indivisibles (so each x
k
i = 0 or 1) at price vector p
according to their net utility gain, gk = u(bk)−λpbk. She picks the basket with highest gk as
long as it is positive, and otherwise picks the null basket b0 = (0, ..., 0) at price pb0 = 0 and
gain g0 = u(0)− λpb0 = 0. Ignoring trivialities where a more valued basket has lower price,
it follows that basket k will be preferred to basket j if and only if u(b
k)−u(bj)
pbk−pbj ≥ λ. The gain
in utility by choosing k over j must exceed the shadow utility of the additional expenditure,
i.e., the incremental quality-price ratio must exceed the marginal utility of money.
By contrast, the budget constrained consumer would pick the highest quality item that
does not break her budget. To illustrate the difference, consider the following two scenarios.
In the first, the consumer has two baskets available, with u(b1) < u(b2) and pb1 = B < pb2
while 0 < g2 = u(b2) − λpb2 < u(b1) − λpb1 = g1, so that both decision rules lead to the
purchase of basket 1. The second scenario is the same, except that the price of b2 drops so that
p′b2 = pb1 + ε. According to the budget rule, basket 2 is still not affordable, so the consumer
still buys 1. However, when ε is sufficiently small that g′2 = u(b2)−λp′b2 > u(b1)−λpb1 = g1,
the consumer using the λ rule would switch to the suddenly relatively inexpensive basket.
Crucially, the λ rule would coincide with the new lifetime optimum, while the budget rule
would not.
The appearance of a new variety (or a change in the valuation of an existing one) creates
a similar contrast. Assume that the perceived quality of the expensive option in the first
scenario jumps from u(b2) to a much higher value, with its price remaining constant. This
change would not affect the choice according to the budget rule, but it would clearly lead to
– the lifetime optimal – change in behavior according to the λ rule.
4.2 Adjusting λ
The consumer treats λ as a constant in all subproblems considered so far, but there are
several situations that require an update, even if a full reoptimization of the life-problem is
not necessary.
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Let us first consider shocks to lifetime income, which are too large to be ignored but not
large enough to necessitate a full reoptimization. In this case the solution is to improve on
the precision of the approximation. The second-order Taylor expansion of the indirect utility
function tells us what is needed. Suppose that lifetime income “jumps” from L0 to L1. The
Taylor approximation around the original lifetime income is V (y) ≈ V (L0)+(y−L0)V ′(L0)+
(y−L0)2
2
V ′′(L0). We can also approximate V (y) by a first-order Taylor expansion around the
new lifetime income: V (y) ≈ V (L1) + (y − L1)V ′(L1). Differentiating both approximations
with respect to y, we have V ′(L0) + (y − L0)V ′′(L0) ≈ V ′(L1). Finally, letting y = L1 we
obtain
λ1 = V
′(L1) ≈ V ′(L0) + (L1 − L0)V ′′(L0) = λ− β∆L, (16)
where ∆L = L1 − L0 is the change in lifetime income and β = −V ′′(L) ≥ 0 is the rate at
which marginal utility diminishes.
Let us quantify the lifetime income effects that we ignore for small expenditures:
Proposition 3. For two goods, the sensitivity of consumption to lifetime income is given by
dM1(p, λ)
dL
≈ −β p1u22 − p2u12
u11u22 − u12u21 , (17)
dM2(p, λ)
dL
≈ −β p2u11 − p1u21
u11u22 − u12u21 , (18)
where all the second partials of u are evaluated at the vector x = M(p, λ).
Of course β is close to zero when V is approximately linear, so these effects are indeed
negligible for small changes of lifetime income. Also note that, just as in the standard model,
it is possible that when her lifetime income increases the consumer buys less of one of the
goods. This is the case of a backward bending IEP (note that the ratio of (17) and (18) gives
us the slope of the IEP), and thus these goods are the same old inferior goods of Marshall.
Proof. We first calculate how the Marshall-Edgeworth demand varies around the optimal
choice as λ changes. Recall from (9) that
u1 (M(p, λ)) = λp1
u2 (M(p, λ)) = λp2.
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Differentiating both sides of both equations with respect to λ and solving the resulting system
of linear equations we obtain
dM1(p, λ)
dλ
=
p1u22 − p2u12
u11u22 − u12u21 ,
dM2(p, λ)
dλ
=
p2u11 − p1u21
u11u22 − u12u21 .
Now note that dMi(p,λ)
dL
= dMi(p,λ)
dλ
· dλ
dL
. Finally, from (16) we have that dλ
dL
≈ −β and our
proof is complete. Q.E.D.
The purchase of a big ticket item, like an automobile, has a similar effect to a moderate
shock to lifetime income. We can also use a second-order approximation to calculate λ, with
the wealth shock substituted by the representative price of the cars under consideration. In
case the price range considered is so large that the use of the same λ for all varieties leads
to an inaccurate estimate, we can have an individual second order estimate of λ for each
potential item, λi = λ+βpi. The consumer will then choose the variety, b
i, which maximizes
her surplus utility u(bi)− λipi.
4.3 Learning the value of money
As the consumer observes more and more prices, she needs to consider updating her λ based
on the new information. We propose a two-step adaptive updating process for λ. The first
step is to translate a price observation into news about the value of λ, and the second is to
determine the magnitude of the update.
Translation is straightforward for indivisible goods. The quality-price ratio u(b
k)
pbk
is a
natural candidate as a new observation of λ. For divisible goods, we need a somewhat
different procedure – we would never get a new observation, since x is chosen to satisfy
u1(x)
p1
= λ. Instead, we recall the quantity chosen “last time”, xold, and evaluate the marginal
quality-price ratio at that choice, using the new prices. That is, the new observation of λ is
u1(xold)
pnew1
.
As for the second step, the logical procedure is to “weight” the new observation according
to its share in overall consumption, the same way as official inflation figures are calculated.3
3Here we assume, for simplicity that the consumer does not try to extrapolate from individual observed
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In line with the idea that the consumer treats λ as a constant, she will only update it
periodically – say, monthly – in possession of m new observations. Define qi ∈ [0, 1] as the
share of overall expenditure spent on good i in the past “month”. Then the formula to
update λ is
λ
′
=
(
1−
m∑
i=1
αiqi
)
λ+
m∑
i=1
αiqiλi. (19)
Here αi ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter measuring how much the consumer weighs new information
relative to old. It also captures the consumer’s perception of the permanence of any price
changes. Thus a one-off “fire sale” should not carry weight (very low αi) while a price hike
due to a specific tax levied on a product should have an αi close to one.
Other than the permanence of price change issue, we would expect αi not to vary with
categories but to be larger for individuals whose marginal utility diminishes more quickly.
It may be worth noting that when the consumer buys an indivisible good, the new λ
observation will always be above the updated value, while when she does not buy it will
always be below. Thus the decision whether to consume will be the same with the updated
λ as with the old value.
Note that this updating rule also implies that observations of prices of goods that the
consumer does not usually purchase (low qi) do not affect her view of λ. Similarly, if a good
gets priced out of a consumer’s reach, she will stop buying it and this will lead to its exclusion
from effecting her view of λ.
4.4 Saving and borrowing
The budget actually plays two distinct roles that often are conflated in textbook analysis.
So far we have discussed the budget as targeted expenditure (optimal or otherwise) in the
subproblem. The budget also can serve to represent liquidity, a constraint on the purchasing
power available in the subproblem, beyond the lifetime constraint PX = 0 discussed earlier.
This second role can be important even for a new Marshallian consumer, as we will show in
this section.
To deal with liquidity issues, we impose a discrete time structure on lifetime consumption
prices to changes in the price level. See Angus Deaton (1977) for an exploration of that idea.
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and take the subproblem as single period consumption choice. Thus, for time periods t =
1, 2, ..., let the consumer choose consumption bundle xt ∈ <n+ and receive a net inflow xt0 ∈ <
of liquid net income. She earns interest at rate q ≥ −1 on unspent liquid balances, and pays
interest at rate r ≥ q on expenditures in excess of the stock of available liquidity, Lt.4 Thus
the stock of liquidity evolves according to
Lt+1(px
t) = Lt + x
t+1
0 − e(pxt, Lt), with e(pxt, Lt) = pxt + r
[
pxt − Lt
]+ − q [Lt − pxt]+
where [y]+ = max{0, y}. That is, tomorrow’s liquidity will be today’s liquidity plus tomor-
row’s liquid income minus today’s net expenditure, e(px, Lt), evaluated tomorrow, including
interest payments.
The indirect utility (or value) function V in (3) now needs to track liquid assets more
carefully. We rewrite it as follows.
V̂t(Lt) = max
x≥0
[
u(x) + V̂t+1 (Lt+1(px))
]
. (20)
As a result of the change in the set of feasible consumption paths, the slope V̂ ′t+1 (Lt+1(px)) ,
and thus the marginal utility of money, will be different from V ′t+1(L) in the frictionless case.
Linearizing as before, we have
max
x≥0
[u(x)− λe(px, Lt)]. (21)
The first-order conditions are
ui(x
∗) = λ̂pi, i = 1, ..., n, (22)
where
λ̂ =
 λ(1 + q), if Lt > pxλ(1 + r), if Lt < px. (23)
The case r = q is essentially the same as before, after rescaling. When r < q, however,
we have in effect a non-constant λ. Figure 3 shows what then happens in the omitted case
Lt = px in (23).
4We assume constant one-period interest rates, but the reasoning here could be extended to deal with
multi-period interest rates that rise with indebtedness and shift downward when additional collateral (illiquid
assets) are available. This could lead to a strictly increasing λ as opposed to the simple step function of
Figure 3.
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ui/pi 
(1+q)λ 
Lt=px 
utility/$ 
(1+r)λ 
expenditure	  
Figure 3: Optimal consumption with liquidity constraints. Expenditure is along the IEP, where
ui/pi is the same for all goods i = 1, ..., n. In the case shown, optimal expenditure px
∗ equals
available liquidity Lt.
Two extreme cases are of special interest. A paycheck-to-paycheck consumer is unable
to borrow and she cannot earn interest on any small saving she might have, so q = 0 and
r = ∞ in (23). She still has to make several purchasing decisions under a single binding
budget constraint. At decisions prior to the last one, she should still use the λ rule, as that
allows for the lowest level of aggregation. The only difference with respect to consumers with
access to capital markets is that her λ comes from the solution of the remainder of a the pay
period, rather than her rest-of-life problem. Current expenditure is no longer insignificant,
so λ can move a bit.5
The other extreme case is the budget-constrained consumer featured in textbooks. He is
supposed to be unable to even store any of today’s budget B = Lt, so r =∞ and q = −1 in
(23). In Figure 3, the bottom step is on the horizontal axis and the other step is in the sky,
5Even so, the λ rule remains superior to the budget rule even in the parametric example of Section 3.2.
To see this, set 2p1 = p2 in (13) and (14), signifying that today’s expenditure is roughly half as much as the
remainder until the next paycheck arrives. This would still leave the elasticity of expenditure at −2/3, while
the elasticity of the marginal value of money would be −1/3. The quality of the approximation would also
deteriorate – µλ ∈ [1, 1.25] – but not enough to compensate for the difference. Only if there is no need for
disaggregation does our method lose its edge.
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so the consumer always chooses to spend exactly B = Lt.
A policy implication is that it is better to raise (income) taxes in boom times as they
will lead to lower (expected) income effects, since they are less likely to move taxpayers from
the saving to the borrowing region of their liquidity.
It is also worth noting that we can no longer claim that a price change has no short
term income effects once λ depends on expenditure. Of course, for our step function,we still
have that the point elasticity of income is zero almost everywhere, but we can have a better
insight by looking at arc elasticities. As we prove in Appendix C, the arc elasticities will be
still lower under the λ rule than under a budget constraint.
5 Applications
5.1 Heuristics
Our discussion so far has been in an orthodox neoclassical vein, but we believe that the new
Marshallian approach also contributes to behavioral economics. Even if the lifetime choice
problem is never solved and the marginal utility of money is imperfectly calibrated, the λ
rule is nevertheless a very convenient and effective rule of thumb.
Convenience is obvious. We have already seen that a single mental yardstick, λ, can
be used to choose whether and how much to buy of any isolated good, or of any separable
bundle of related goods, whether divisible or indivisible. The same mental yardstick also
applies to work decisions. For example, a piece rate worker (or consultant) optimally works
until the marginal disutility equals the wage times λ. Likewise the “big ticket” version of
the λ rule tells a worker whether to accept a salaried job, or one with fixed hours.
Effectiveness deserves further discussion. Recall that applying fixed budgets to a set of
separable subproblems will typically result in a range of shadow prices µ of expenditure. A
standard argument shows that the consumer will gain by reallocating expenditure from low
µ subproblems to those with high µ. By contrast, there is no such deadweight efficiency loss
under the λ rule. As long the miscalibration of λ is no worse than that of the average µ
under the budget rule, the λ rule will yield more efficient decisions.
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How good an estimate of λ should we expect in typical consumers? Faced with a new
subproblem, the consumer need not try to re-solving her lifetime problem (1) or (3). Instead,
it can be inferred from her work plan. The marginal utility of leisure divided by the wage
is a simple approximation of λ, and it is precisely correct when labor choice is an interior
optimum. Previous consumption decisions, of course, also provide convenient estimates of
λ; a consumer who has taken the trouble to optimize once can subsequently free ride on her
own calculations.
Of course, some consumers may have a persistently biased view of their true marginal
utility for money. A miser is someone who (perhaps because of an impoverished childhood
and stalled adjustment) maintains an unreasonably high λ, relative to typical preferences
and to his actual lifetime opportunities. Likewise a spendthrift maintains an unreasonably
low λ. Thus the λ rule can be thought of as a heuristic, which is suboptimal to the extent
that λ is badly calibrated.
Recent behavioral economics literature includes an alternative heuristic called narrow
bracketing, or mental accounting (e.g., Daniel Read, George Lowenstein and Matthew Rabin,
1999; or Richard Thaler, 1999). In our terminology, the claim is that consumers sometimes
treat non-separable subproblems as if they were separable, resulting in inefficient choices,
especially when self control is problematic. For example, a consumer may regard the health
risk as negligible when considering smoking a single cigarette. The addictive properties of
nicotine warrant a broader definition of the subproblem, and the consumer might come to a
different conclusion when considering smoking a pack a day for a year, or for a decade.
In our view, this literature underlines the importance of separability in defining subprob-
lems. We agree that treating a non-separable subproblem in isolation will typically lead to
suboptimal behavior. Our contribution lies mainly in how to proceed after identifying (up
to a reasonable approximation) a separable subproblem.
The mental accounting branch of the literature suggests that people may choose a par-
ticular budget for each subproblem, e.g., bring exactly $2500 to Las Vegas. (The ubiquitous
presence of cash machines in casinos suggests that this self-control device is less than 100%
successful!) Our recommendation, of course, is instead to make choices according to λ. This
doesn’t solve all self-control issues, but it has the virtue of simplicity. The consumer then
only needs to carry a single number, while a consumer using mental accounting would have
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to remember a vector. Additionally, we have a simple procedure for how to adapt λ to
persistent price changes, while we know of no such method for budgets, mental or otherwise.
When is each heuristic more commonly used? This seems like a good question to take
to the laboratory, especially since payments received in lab experiments are normally quite
separate from the rest of the subject’s life. One could set up various moderately complicated
lab tasks, and in one treatment frame the tasks in terms of budgets and in another treatment
frame them in terms of the marginal utility of money. Then one could check which treatment
encouraged more efficient choices. A more direct test is simply to provide access to budgeting
tools as well as λ-oriented tools, and to see which the subjects prefer to use.6
5.2 Disaggregated decisions in firms
Multidivisional firms face a question reminiscent of ours: under what conditions can the
firm profitably decentralize real investment decisions? To the extent that the divisions are
separable, the new Marshallian approach suggests the following decentralized procedure. Let
λ be the parent firm’s opportunity cost of funds, typically proxied by the weighted average
cost of capital. Then each division should invest in scalable projects up to the point that
the marginal return falls to λ, and choose among mutually exclusive projects by maximizing
present value calculated using λ, the direct generalization of the g rule in section 4.1. When
divisions are not separable, the returns should be estimated in terms of incremental net
benefit to the firm as a whole, rather than just to the division. Remarkably, this procedure
is essentially the same as that recommended in standard corporate finance textbooks (see,
for example, Steven Ross, Randolph Westerfield and Bradford Jordan, 2008, Part Four).
Martin Weitzman (1974) discusses the decentralization of decisions on the production
side. He compares the relative advantages of quantity targets vs. transfer prices for a
production unit that is subject to frequent shocks to its costs. He finds no clear winner as
the dead-weight losses depend on the relative slopes of marginal cost and marginal benefit
curves (much like the incidence of ad valorem taxes).7 Weitzman agrees with us when he
6We are grateful to Ryan Oprea for suggesting this line of inquiry.
7The new Marshallian approach would fit into this framework by interpreting λ as the (constant) marginal
benefit from the production of an additional unit. For such a situation Weitzman would declare transfer
price, that is λ, as the clear winner.
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concludes that prices have a comparative advantage when coordination between units is not
a major concern and when there are several units producing substitutes .
5.3 Money illusion
Of course, lifetime utility U(X) depends only on actual work and consumption, and is
independent of nominal quantities such as L and P . Indeed, the indirect utility function
is homogeneous of degree 0 in (L, P ) (see, for example, Varian (1992), p. 102). Hence a
proportional change in all prices (and wages) will have no effect on the work/consumption
plans or utility of Homo Economicus. The same is true in the textbook consumer choice
subproblem with the budget B adjusted in the same proportion as the price vector.
However, inflation in the real world is much messier than a simultaneous proportional
change. An important empirical regularity is that relative prices become more volatile as the
measured rate of inflation rises (see, for example, Daniel Heymann and Axel Leijonhufvud,
1995). Actual people updating λ, therefore, are unlikely to immediately adjust to a change
in the price level. According to (19) they will overreact to nominal increases in wages and
lag in reacting to observed nominal increases in prices of purchased goods (see, for example,
David Genesove and Christopher Mayer, 2001). That is, in the parlance of macroeconomic
theory, they will suffer from money illusion.
Eventually, however, they should adapt fully to the new price level. For a proportional
upward change in all prices (and wages, etc.) from P to cP , with c > 1, then λ will shift
downward proportionately to λ/c.8 Money is worth less at a higher price level.
6 Discussion
The new Marshallian approach to consumer choice centers on λ, the marginal utility of
money. It applies to any separable subproblem regarding work, or consumption, or both,
and λ can be described as the opportunity cost of expenditure in the continuation game
8This can be seen from the general result that derivatives of homogeneous degree k functions are
homogeneous degree k − 1, or verified directly from the definitions: λ′ = limch→0 V (cL−ch)−V (cL)ch =
c−1 V (L−h)−V (L)h = c
−1λ. The middle equality follows from the degree 0 homogeneity of V .
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following the subproblem. The λ rule states that expenditure on a good (or on the efficient
bundles of goods along an appropriate income expansion path, IEP) should increase until
its marginal utility diminishes to λ.
The resulting Marshall-Edgeworth demand functions M(p, λ) share some features with
their standard and Hicksian counterparts x∗(p,B) and h(p, u) – notably, for a given subprob-
lem price vector p, all three lie on the same IEP – but M has several distinct advantages.
• It is very simple and specific – the single number λ is a sufficient statistic for the hugely
complex rest-of-life problem. By contrast, each subproblem requires its own budget B
in the standard approach, and short of re-solving the lifetime problem, it is unclear
how B might be determined.
• It is robust to changes in subproblem prices. No change in λ is required when p changes.
By contrast, the appropriate B depends sensitively on p.
• Its elasticities are a first-order approximation of the true General Equilibrium elastici-
ties, and the approximation is exact in a fully separable subproblem whose expenditure
is a negligible part of lifetime income. Standard or Hicksian elasticities are close to GE
elasticities in such subproblems only in the special case that they coincide with M ’s.
• It is quite intuitive – the consumer tries directly to get her money’s worth. We suspect
that it is also quite descriptive of actual consumer behavior, but we are not aware of
any empirical studies so far that compare the predictive power of M and x∗.
To better understand the new Marshallian approach, recall the traditional distinction
between non-pecuniary consumption externalities and pecuniary externalities. The first kind
recognizes that how much the consumer values a certain quantity of a good may depend on
what else is in her consumption basket. Often this kind of externality extends only to a small
set of goods, e.g., a few complements and close substitutes, and then we can internalize this
externality in a tractable separable subproblem of the lifetime problem. The second kind,
pecuniary externalities, are pervasive and not so easy to encapsulate. Expenditures are
mutually exclusive, and money spent on one good is not available to purchase any other
good. But λ precisely captures this kind of externality.
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By contrast, it is hard to specify the appropriate subproblem to which to apply a budget
B in the standard approach. The larger the set of goods, the better internalized is the
pecuniary externality, and the closer one gets to the true lifetime GE problem. But at the
same time, one loses the tractability of low-dimensional partial equilibrium analysis.
The new approach points up the fact that partial equilibrium analysis routinely conflates
the available liquidity L with the expenditure B targeted at a subproblem. Otherwise put,
the natural subproblem boundaries need not coincide with the boundaries of binding liquidity
constraints. Given access to perfectly liquid financial markets, it is erroneous to specify B
other than the lifetime budget constraint. When there are additional liquidity constraints,
they are best dealt with as in section 4.4, where the textbook analysis is shown to be an
extreme and unrealistic special case.
Some readers may object to our use of cardinal utility functions. But the insistence on
ordinal utility for consumer choice seems increasingly anomalous, since cardinal utility has
become so pervasive elsewhere in economics. Varian’s textbook, for example, uses cardinal
functions without apology in earlier chapters on production technology and later chapters
on risky choice. Why should the sole exception be consumer choice in the absence of risk?
A key insight from the new Marshallian approach is that budgets should not be applied
piecemeal to subproblems, but instead all subproblems should be solved consistently using a
single sufficient statistic, the marginal utility of money. The point is that funds are fungible,
as has long been recognized in other branches of economics.9
One final thought. For several generations, economics instructors have tortured under-
graduates with various decompositions of income and substitution effects, and picky dis-
tinctions between gross and net substitutes and complements, etc. One benefit of the new
Marshallian approach is that it will sweep away such dross, and restore a measure of common
sense to consumer choice theory.
9In public finance, for example, it is well known that a uniform income tax is more efficient for raising a
given amount of revenue than a collection of specific taxes on individual items. We thank Donald Wittman
for pointing out the analogy.
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7 Notes on related literature
Following the initial intellectual boost by Friedrich Hayek (1945), the issue of partial ag-
gregation was the subject of a lot of (very technical) study more than half a century ago.
The idea was to find (nearly) separable parts of an economic problem so that the external-
ities across parts can be internalized in a manageable manner. Main contributions include
Wassily Leontieff (1947), Robert Strotz (1957, 1959), Terence Gorman (1959, 1968), Herbert
Simon and Albert Ando (1961), and Ge´rard Debreu (1960). The latter offers an ordinal
definition of separability, essentially that preferences over x, y ∈ ξ[n] are independent of X⊥.
He shows under quite general conditions that this entails a cardinal (vNM) utility function
over separable subproblems.10
While we also feel inspired by Hayek, our contribution is more conceptual than this
literature and does not delve into the technicalities of separability/aggregation more than
strictly necessary to get our ideas across.
James C. Cox (1975) provides a more complete derivation of the indirect utility function
than we do, though with an emphasis on financial assets.
Xavier Vives (1987) has a kindred contribution to ours in that he also attempts to bring
Marshallian ideas back to the mainstream and use them to defend the partial equilibrium
approach. He shows that as the number of goods, n, increases, the income effects in any
single market are indeed vanishing at at least a rate of 1/
√
n.
Finally, Jo´zsef Sa´kovics (2011) was the first to present a model of consumer choice where
budget constraints are soft. In his case the consumers misperceive prices and hence satisfy
the budget constraint for these, so actually they either under or overspend.
10Our thanks to Luciano Andreozzi for bringing this paper to our attention.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix A: Marginal utility along the IEP
Let x∗1(x2) denote the IEP. We know that
p2u1 (x
∗
1(x2), x2) ≡ p1u2 (x∗1(x2), x2) .
Differentiating both sides according to x2 we obtain
p2
(
dx∗1(x2)
dx2
u11 + u12
)
= p1
(
dx∗1(x2)
dx2
u21 + u22
)
,
which simplifies to
dx∗1(x2)
dx2
=
p2u12 − p1u22
p1u21 − p2u11 ,
giving us the slope of the IEP.
Now we can derive the formula for the marginal utility of good 2 along the IEP:
du (x∗1(x2), x2)
dx2
=
dx∗1(x2)
dx2
u1 + u2 =
p2u12 − p1u22
p1u21 − p2u11u1 + u2.
8.2 Appendix B: Decomposition of price effects
The textbook price effects are ordinal, shaped by the budget constraint, and involve the
Slutsky decomposition into substitution and income effects. The standard Sltutsky equation
is
∂xi(p, e)
∂p1
=
∂hi(p, u(p, e))
∂p1
− xi(p, e)∂xi(p, e)
∂e
, (24)
where x(p, e) is the standard demand at prices p and available expenditure e, and h(p, u)
denotes the Hicksian (expenditure minimizing) demand at prices p and achieved utility u.
The first right hand term in (24) is the substitution effect, measuring the rate of movement
along a fixed indifference curve onto a new IEP as a result of a price change. The second
term is the income effect, the sign of which depends on the slope of the Engel curve, ∂xi(p,e)
∂e
.
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The new Marshallian counterpart of (24) can be obtained by differentiating both sides of
the identity Mi(p, λ) ≡ xi(p, e(p, λ)), where e(p, λ) is the optimal expenditure given p and λ.
∂Mi(p, λ)
∂p1
=
∂xi(p, e)
∂p1
+
∂xi(p, e)
∂e
· ∂e(p, λ)
∂p1
(25)
Substituting (24) into (25) one obtains
∂Mi(p, λ)
∂p1
=
∂hi(p, u(p, e))
∂p1
+
∂xi(p, e)
∂e
·
(
∂e(p, λ)
∂p1
− xi(p, e)
)
. (26)
Equation (26) shows that the substitution effect is the same in both models. This comes
as no surprise, as the substitution effect only depends on the new IEP, which – as we have
seen – is model independent. The remaining term, which we shall call the expenditure effect,
is quite different from its textbook counterpart. Instead of arising from an effort to keep
nominal expenditure constant as prices change (as in the textbook analysis), it comes from
adjusting expenditure for a given marginal utility of money.
Proposition 4. The difference between the income and the expenditure effects is
D = −
[
x1(p, e) +
(
p1
∂M1(p, λ)
∂p1
+ p2
∂M2(p, λ)
∂p1
)]
∂xi(p, e)
∂e
. (27)
Proof. Subtract (26) from (24) to obtain the difference is −∂e(p,λ)
∂p1
· ∂xi(p,e)
∂e
. By definition
e(p, λ) = M1(p, λ)p1 +M2(p, λ)p2, and differentiating that identity wrt p1 yields
∂e(p, λ)
∂p1
= M1(p, λ) + p1
∂M1(p, λ)
∂p1
+ p2
∂M2(p, λ)
∂p1
.
The consumption of the first good can be written M1(p, λ) = x1(p, e), so we obtain the
desired expression. Q.E.D.
The interpretation of (27) is the following. When a consumer is constrained by a budget,
the sensitivity of her expenditure to p1 (holding utility constant) is
∂e(p, u)
∂p1
= h1(p, u) + p1
∂h1(p, u)
∂p1
+ p2
∂h2(p, u)
∂p1
= h1(p, u) = x1(p, e),
where the last two terms add to zero by the standard tangency condition at the optimum:
−p1
p2
= ∂h2(p,u)
∂h1(p,u)
. In other words, as the consumer must keep spending the same amount,
the price change has an income effect proportional to the pre-change consumption of the
good. When the consumer can freely move purchasing power across the boundary of the
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subproblem, the expenditure changes in line with the new demand, taking into account the
optimal adjustment of consumption.
The following corollary is immediate:
Corollary 1. Either own or cross price elasticity of demand is larger in the new Marshallian
model than in the standard one if and only if either the good in question is normal and
M1 >
u2u21−u1u22
u11u22−u12u21 , or the good is inferior and M1 <
u2u21−u1u22
u11u22−u12u21 .
Proof. We use Proposition 2 together with the identity λpi = ui, to obtain that D =[
−M1 − u1u22−u2u21u11u22−u12u21
]
∂xi(p,e)
∂e
. Q.E.D.
8.3 Appendix C: Income elasticity with liquidity constraints
Proposition 5. For normal goods, the (short term) income arc elasticity of demand is
strictly lower when the consumer is not budget constrained, but uses the λ rule.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us assume that the income shock is positive, denote
it by ∆. In that case, the effect on λ will be non-positive – as by normality all the marginal
utility functions will shift down – and it will be negative only if the consumer moves from
borrowing to saving.11 If she borrowed before then µ(B) > λ(1 + r), if she is saving now
then µ(B + ∆) < λ(1 + q), implying that µ(B) − µ(B + ∆) > λ(r − q). As the changes in
marginal utility are proportional to the changes in the Lagrange multipliers (c.f. (6)), the
proof is complete. Q.E.D.
It is worth noting that an implication of Proposition 5 is that by allowing for the smooth-
ing of income shocks across periods our model makes the current consumption decisions less
responsive to these shocks, providing a possible a micro-foundation for the Permanent Income
Hypothesis in a disaggregated environment.
11In the case that the consumer spends her liquidity exactly, we can impute her a λ̂ ∈ [λ(1 + q), λ(1 + r)],
and the same argument goes through (c.f. Figure 3).
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